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FREEING THE MIND: FREE SOFTWARE AND THE
DEATH OF PROPRIETARY CULTURE
Eben Moglen*
The subject matter we are going to talk about is variously named and the
words have some resonances of importance. I am going to use the phrase "Free
Software" to describe this material, and I am going to suggest to you that the choice
of words is relevant. We are talking not merely about a form of production or a
system of industrial relations, but also about the beginning of a social movement
with specific political goals, which will characterize not only the production of
software in the twenty-first century, but the production and distribution of culture
generally.
My purpose this morning is to put that process in large enough context so that
the significance of free software can be seen beyond the changes in the software
industry alone. BUSINESS WEEK, we can assume, needs to hype its material in order
to make people want to read below the first paragraph. But I think BUSINESS WEEK
here is probably guilty of low blood pressure.
Earlier this week in Brazil, the chief technology officer of the Microsoft Cor-
poration, Craig Mundie, made a public speech, in which he said that my client the
Free Software Foundation (the Free Software Foundation and only the Free Soft-
ware Foundation) was destroying the global software industry. Now, the Free
Software Foundation, which I have represented for ten years and on whose board I
have the honor to sit, has an annual budget in the neighborhood of $750,000, and
total assets of slightly under two million; it is supported entirely by donative con-
tributions, mostly from individuals. The Microsoft Corporation, as some of you
know, has a market capitalization of several hundred billion dollars, and possesses
fifty billion dollars in cash at the moment. It is the single most profitable mo-
nopoly in the history of the world. I am deeply grateful to Mr. Mundie for his
accurate assessment of the current state of affairs between his organization and
mine.
So why does he think that we are doing something important to him? There is
a certain degree of partisan chagrin in what he is saying. We are not destroying the
global software industry, we are destroying the monopoly, which has been exer-
cised for quite some while now by his employer, despite the best efforts (the tem-
porary best efforts) of the United States government, the European Union, and a
number of well-funded commercial competitors who have uniformly failed.
I would disagree with BUSINESS WEEK because I think the Netscape browser is
a pretty greasy, unimportant little tool, of no fundamental significance, whose chal-
lenge to Microsoft in the early 1990s, in the so-called "middle ware" market, was
a comparatively unimportant run even before AOL bought Netscape and began its
ambivalent relation to competition with Microsoft, an ambivalence about which
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you have all been reading recently.
We are doing something else. We are changing what software is, not just how
it is made, but how it works in relation to all the other aspects of human intellectual
production. Software, by which I here mean executable bitstreams that instruct
computers in what to do (there are lots of other types of software and we will be
discussing them in the course of this hour: they include music, movies, train sched-
ules, and all other useful forms of information in the twenty-first century). Soft-
ware is becoming in the twenty-first century a public utility, not a product. We are
doing that for a reason.
The reason, which was sketched out in the work of my colleague, friend, and
client Richard Stallman in the early 1980s, is to protect the ethical right to share
information. This is properly understood as the intellectual context of Western
science and literature-not as an invention of the 1980s, not as a consequence of
our particular personal, intellectual or moral idiosyncrasies. It is the received un-
derstanding of our common culture with regard to the production of knowledge by
collaborative effort. The free sharing of scientific information is the essence of
Western science. And without the concept of the free sharing of information-
Western scientists have been pointing out since Galileo pointed it out to the Church
in the mid-sixteenth century-the advance of knowledge would be either impos-
sible or impossibly burdened.
The context of the transformation of society from analog to digital means of
information transmission posed a threat to the free exchange of information, a
threat which you all see becoming tangible around you in every area of life from
day to day. Information distribution, from the adoption of movable type printing
in the West at the end of the fifteenth century until the end of the twentieth, was an
industrial process. Information was turned into physical artifacts that it costs money
to make, move, and sell. Accordingly, an economy of information distribution
arose, which required payment streams to recoup the costs of making, moving, and
selling physical artifacts containing information. That process came to center around
the creation of property rights-through a logic of the raising of streams of pay-
ment to recoup the costs of production familiar to everybody-in every branch of
Western economic thought. The morality of that process, however, depended on
the fact that there was no alternative. Because this form of distribution inevitably
resulted in the exclusion of some people from information, societies, as their wealth
increased, tended to attempt to offset that exclusionary effect-the undesired, ex-
clusionary effect--of property rights and information production by socialized
measures to ensure access; the public library, the public university, and so on.
Thus, by the middle of the twentieth century, it had become the dogma of the West
that information costs money to make, move, and sell. That information cost must
be recouped by exclusionary property rights ("you may not have this information
unless you pay for it") and that the harshness of coercive distribution of informa-
tion goods could be ameliorated in the familiar way by semi-socialized institutions
that offset the distributive unfairness of coercive models of information, produc-
tion, and distribution. That, in a nutshell, is how we got to the point at which
things threatened to become terrible, because the advance of technology removed
the barrier to universal access. But our minds did not change with respect to the
paradigms of information production and distribution. The conversion to digital
technology means that every work of utility or beauty, every computer program,
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every piece of music, every piece of visual or literary art, every piece of video,
every useful piece of information-train schedule, university curriculum, map,
chart-every piece of useful information or beautiful information on earth can be
distributed to everybody at the same cost that it can be distributed to anybody.
For the first time in human history, we face an economy in which the most
important goods have zero marginal cost. And the transformation to digital meth-
ods of production and distribution, therefore, poses to the twenty-first century a
fundamental moral problem. If I can provide to everyone all goods of intellectual
value or beauty, for the same price that I can provide the first copy of those works
to anyone, why is it ever moral to exclude anyone from anything? If you could
feed everyone on earth at the cost of baking one loaf and pressing a button, what
would be the moral case for charging more for bread than some people could af-
ford to pay? This represents the difficulty at which we find ourselves straining at
the opening of the twenty-first century. Vast institutions are committed to the
social philosophy that only exclusionary practices inevitably involving the large-
scale continuance of unnecessary ignorance are essential to the production of use-
ful information. Vast economic rents are being extracted from the world, and enor-
mous numbers of people are going unfulfilled in intellectual and esthetic needs
that we can provide for. One inevitable consequence of the continuance of that
approach is that people are forbidden to share.
In 1993, the National Information Infrastructure Working Group on Intellec-
tual Property (IPWG), led by the chair of the Patent Trademark Office (PTO),
Bruce Lehman, produced a green paper on intellectual property in the evolving
Internet, which became eventually a White House policy document in the first
Clinton administration. The IPWG report stated that, although it would indeed be
necessary to increase copyright infringement penalties drastically, that measure
would be inadequate to change social behavior sufficiently to protect intellectual
property in the Net. Accordingly, the IPWG suggested, every school receiving
federal funds should have a curriculum in grades K- 12, teaching children that it is
wrong to share information. They suggested-I am not fooling you-a slogan in
the aftermath of Mrs. Reagan's extraordinary success at ending drug abuse in
America. The slogan was: "Just say yes to licensing." What they did not explain
was what you call the institution in which you explained to children that it is wrong
to share information; it seemed improbable that one would continue to call such a
place a school. Nonetheless, I thought that their intellectual honesty was extremely
commendable. They had come to the heart of the problem. Their goal was the
maintenance of existing social and economic relationships at the expense of the
incurring of the fundamental intellectual inconsistency of their position: that we
must teach people that they must not teach others, or else.
It is in that context that we have made a social network committed to the
proposition that the central executable elements of human technology can be pro-
duced by sharing-without exclusionary property relations. And that if the central
executable elements of technology can be made by sharing, without exclusionary
property relations, then the non-executable elements of culture-art, useful infor-
mation, and so on--can be distributed without exclusionary property relations. It
is this process, which you are presently witnessing.
When I began working as a computer programmer for pay, in the early 1970s,
there was a goal. Software developers had a purpose. The purpose was embodied
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in a four-word phrase: "Write once, run everywhere." It meant, develop software
which can be made to run on all of the hardware that even then rather heteroge-
neously populated society. It was, from the point of view of venture-capital funded,
profit-making, investor-owned industries, an impossible goal, never achieved. We
did it.
GNU, Linux, and all the thousands of other programs in the free software
world, run, as Rita Heimes correctly said, on everything. From the palm top, and
the cell phone, and the single-purpose appliance-like the digital camera and the
personal video recorder-to the mainframe. There was one purpose to software
engineering overall throughout my lifetime, and we did it. The best-funded mo-
nopoly in the history of the world does not even try.
There are reasons, which I have explored in my writing, including in the piece
"Anarchism Triumphant," that production of executable software without prop-
erty relations inherently develops superior software-not immediately, but over
the long term. The analysis of that proposition I leave in detail for further discus-
sion. Its essence is this: software (executable software) is an inherently incremen-
tal intellectual product. This is an argument, by the way, against the application of
the patent system to it, not a philosophical one, but a technical one. The appropri-
ate invocation of the principle of novelty and non-obviousness to software results
in zero software patents. All persons reasonably skilled in the art are capable of
achieving each result incrementally, from where the art is at any given moment.
But more important, for our purposes, the process of making software is massively
parallelizable, when the costs of communication and coordination are reduced near
zero.
The Net is a superconductive medium for the creation of software. So, as I
wrote in 1999, when it was a little less obvious than it is today, we are witnessing
a phenomenon that was first noticed by Michael Faraday at the beginning of the
nineteenth century. Wrap a coil around a magnet; spin the magnet. Electrical
current flows in the wire. One does not ask, "What is the incentive for the elec-
trons to leave home?" It is an inherent emergent property of the system, we have
a name for it: we call it induction. The question we ask is, "What is the resistance
of the wire?" Moglen's corollary to Faraday's Law says wrap the Internet around
every brain on the planet; spin the planet. Software flows in the network. It is
wrong to ask, "What is the incentive for people to create?" It is an emergent
property of connected human minds that they do create. The forms in which they
create, like the evolution of spoken and written language, like the disposition of
means, cultural forms, patterns of pottery, shapes of musical endeavor, and so on,
are structural characteristics of the human mind. We are a social species, and we
create together; that is our nature. The question to ask is, "What is the resistance of
the network?" Moglen's corollary to Ohm's Law states that the resistance of the
network is directly proportional to the field strength of the intellectual property
system. The conclusion is: Resist the resistance. Which is what we do. We have
been doing it in an exponential growth curve for slightly over twenty years. Now
we have forty-percent of the server market. We are going to have a hundred-
percent of the appliance market within five years. That is a trivial economic de-
duction from the following simple fact: when you sell a $400 palm top, you can
afford to pay a license fee for its operating system, of $24.95, or $49.95, or incur
expensive in-house development activity and make a Palm OS. When the box cost
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fifty bucks, there is no room left for paying $12.95 to Mr. Gates: we win. We win.
We all do it together; the software is a public utility; "write once, run every-
where"; we are done. This is a noticeable proposition, not just to us-though we
understand why it is socially and politically desirable that the world work this way.
It is a noticeable proposition for the International Business Machines, Corpora-
tion, too. You now have, after a mere twenty years of work on our part, the largest,
best-funded technology company on earth fundamentally on our side with respect
to how the information technology system will work in the twenty-first century.
Sam Palmisano, Irving Wladawski, Berger, you read them all the time, theirs is a
simple proposition: software is a public utility, computing is an on-demand ser-
vice provided by service providers who handle the internalized costs of making
computing possible, and so on.
Thus, we observe a political economy fact about software. If you have a
network and you share, you can achieve the ethical goal of allowing everybody to
understand, to improve, to find and fix bugs, to create better software, and to share
information in a way that allows people to increase their technical skills. Free
software is the single greatest technical library on earth. I say that because Free
Software is the only place on earth where a person can go from naivet6, to the state
of the art, in everything that a particular field contains, solely by reading material
that is universally available at no cost everywhere the network exists. That is the
single, greatest intellectual capital development program in the world. The legal
system that makes that possible, the GNU General Public License, with which I
have some intimate experience, achieves the creation of a greater and more exten-
sive knowledge exchange program than any other in the world, at no cost. When
my colleagues at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology decided to put their
entire curriculum on the Web--every course, every teaching material, every prob-
lem set, every examination-they were adopting the recognition that the principle
of Western science, the principle of free software, and the principle of non-exclu-
sion are the path of development for the twenty-first century, a proposition which
has its capitalist echo in the behavior of IBM. But for a moment, I just want to
concentrate your attention on the moral and political dimension of that activity. In
the twenty-first century, power is the ability to change the behavior of computers.
If you cannot change the behavior of computers, you live within a Skinner box
created by the people who can change the behavior of computers. Every artifact
around you responds by either handing you a banana pellet or a shock, depending
upon which button you push, and whether you are "right" from the designer's
point of view. In the world in which I grew up, twelve-year-olds became program-
mers because they could read other people's code. Mr. Mundie, speaking in Brazil
earlier this week in the speech I have already referred to, said-and I agree with
him--"the health of the software industry," (by which he means his software in-
dustry, not mine) "depends upon one simple proposition: never show anybody the
source code to anything." Right. More elegantly it cannot be put. And a system
which depends for its continuation upon the universalization of ignorance for pri-
vate profit is an immoral system. Destroying it is merely one more step in the long
history of struggling for freedom.
This is the free software movement. I want to be very clear about that. The
idea of Open Source Software is software that people can read, and I am for that.
But it is important to understand that that inadequately characterizes what we were
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trying to do or why.
Dylan Thomas refers in A Child's Christmas in Wales1 to the ideal Christmas
present of the book that told everything about the wasp, except why. This is, from
my point of view, the problem with the discussion about Open Source: It tells you
everything, except why. I have now told you why.
Free software is an invocation for particular social purposes of the ability to
develop resources in commons. This is not, as I have already pointed out, an
economic novelty. It is the single way in which we have produced the most impor-
tant works of Western intellectual achievement since the Renaissance. It is also
the way in which we have managed for all time fisheries, surface water resources,
and large numbers of other forms of resource beyond human production. Free
software presents an attempt to construct a commons in cyberspace with respect to
executable computer code. It works. It works, with one interesting subdivision of
structural decision-making about how to construct the commons. When we come
to the technicalities of licensing, we will observe that there are two philosophies in
the construction of the commons, one of which is characterized, oddly enough, by
a license with the three-letter name BSD, the Berkley Systems Division license,
which originally covered the distribution of a Unix-like operating system, written
on free-sharing principles, primarily at the University of California. The BSD
license says: "Here is a commons. It is not defended by copyright against appro-
priation. Everything in the commons may be taken and put into proprietary, non-
commons production as easily as it may be incorporated in commons production.
We encourage people to put material into commons, and we are indifferent as to
whether the appropriative use made of commons resources is proprietary, or com-
mons-reinforcing."
The second philosophy for the production of software in commons is embod-
ied in the GNU General Public License of the Free Software Foundation, known
universally throughout the world by another three-letter abbreviation, GPL. The
GPL says: We construct a protected commons, in which by a trick, an irony, the
phenomena of commons are adduced through the phenomena of copyright, re-
stricted ownership is employed to create non-restricted self-protected commons.
The GPL, whose language you have been referred to, is not quite as elegant a
license as I would like but is pretty short; yet I can put it more simply for you. It
says: "Take this software; do what you want with it---copy, modify, redistribute.
But if you distribute, modified or unmodified, do not attempt to give anybody to
whom you distribute fewer rights than you had in the material with which you
began. Have a nice day!" That is all. It requires no acceptance. It requires no
contractual obligation. It says you are permitted to do, just don't try to reduce
anybody else's rights. The result i a commons that protects itself: Appropriation
may be made in an unlimited way, providing that each modification of goods in
commons is returned to commons. Anyone making non-commons use of the ma-
terial is infringing. One says, simply, "You are distributing. Where is your li-
cense?" The defendant has two choices: "I have no license," which is not a good
answer, or "I have a license. It is the GPL," which is not a good answer unless you
are giving everyone else the rights you had in what you started with. I hear quite
often that my license has not been tested in court. This puzzles me. It is, because
1. DYLAN THOMAS, A CHILD'S CHRISTMAS IN WALES (New Directions 1954).
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of the structure of my license, the defendant's obligation affirmatively to plead it,
if she wants to. After all, if she is distributing, it is either without license, in which
case my license does not get tested-there is an unlicensed distribution going on
and it is enjoinable--or the license is pled by the other side. How interesting.
There, if I may put to you briefly, is the trick. That is how it was done. That is how
an enormous commons came into existence throughout the world, not just with
zero cost of goods, movement, and sales, but with near zero cost of enforcement.
For ten years, I did all of the GPL enforcement work around the world by
myself, while teaching full time at a law school. It was not hard, really; the defen-
dant in court would have had no license, or had to choose affirmatively to plead
my license: they did not choose that route. Indeed they did not choose to go to
court; they cooperated, that was the better way. My client did not want damages,
my client wanted compliance. My client did not want publicity, my client wanted
compliance. We settled for compliance all the time. We got compliance all the
time.
The legal arrangements which defend this commons are elegant and simple.
They respond to the proposition that when the marginal costs of goods are zero,
any non-zero cost of barbed wire is too high. That is a fact about the twenty-first
century, and everybody had better get used to it. Yet, as you know, there are enor-
mous cultural enterprises profoundly committed to the proposition that more and
more barbed wire is necessary. And their basic strategy is to get that barbed wire
paid for by the public everywhere. Not just through higher cost of goods, of course,
not just through oligopoly pricing, but through direct government subsidies to the
production of barbed wire and the occasional removal of juvenile human beings
who are impaled upon it. Government should conduct a war on 12-year-olds all
over the globe for the benefit of Jack Valente's employers. This is their solution to
the problem of the morality of distribution in the twenty-first century. It is stupid,
and it will fail.
Now, this brings us to the other part of the significance of free software, which
is proposed in my title. For it is not merely the global software industry which is
being altered, or-as Mr. Mundie would have us believe-destroyed. What is
happening is a more complicated process, more favorable to human freedom and
much more amusing. The distribution of other cultural goods is changing because
production of software is changing.
From my point of view, there are two classes of goods with zero marginal cost
in the twenty-first century. One class of goods is functional; it performs either
better or worse than another class of goods at the same job. Executable computer
software is a good, central, but not the only, example of such functional informa-
tion. Maps, genome information, and other examples could be equally invoked.
My proposition, as I have already put it before you, is that for functional goods
with zero marginal cost, production without property relations produces superior
goods. And this is true the more that collaboration is necessary in order to pro-
duce. Hence free software and soon-as a result of the work that I and hundreds of
other people are doing around the world-free genetic information and machines,
represent the demonstration that this form of production, without exclusion from
the right to understand and produce ones self, produces better goods. So, every-
body who wants to be a producer is, and producers at the margin of the ever-
expanding compact mass of existing production, because nothing requires rein-
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vention. What you have is a system of Lamarckian evolution of functional goods,
in which the acquired characteristics of any one good can be inherited by all the
others. The result, as Lamarck and Darwin and other nineteenth century evolu-
tionary theorists noted, is the rapidest and most positive kind of evolutionary change.
But there is no such thing with respect to non-functional goods. One cannot
say that anarchist music is inherently superior to proprietary music. What one can
say is that in the world of zero marginal cost, anarchist distribution-that is, distri-
bution without exclusion from the act of distributing-produces inherently supe-
rior distribution. This is even easier to perceive than the first proposition. When
the right to distribute goods with zero marginal cost has to be bought and sold,
there are inefficiencies introduced in the social network of distribution. When no
such buying and selling, no such exclusion from the power of distribution exists,
distribution occurs at the native speed of the social network itself.
The famous experiments of Stanley Milgram, now somewhat blown upon,
which gave us the amusing sociological result known as "six degrees of separa-
tion" was a demonstration of the inherent speed of social distribution in the net-
work. Let us suppose six to be a number predicated on only networks of privileged
people with a certain degree of wealth, and so on. As recent research has tended to
show, it is still true that the social distribution network is much deeper and much
richer than anybody previously understood in human history, and that it is inher-
ently superior to systems of distribution networking and constructed by the exclu-
sion of most distributors. The result, as everyone in this room is aware, is that the
twelve-year-olds do a better job of distributing music than the music companies.
The music companies continue to take ninety-four percent of the gross for promot-
ing and distributing music, and the twelve-year-olds who take zero off the top do a
better job. When bandwidth constraints are removed, the same happens to video;
without removal of bandwidth constraints the same happens to publishable text, to
poetry, and to all forms of useful knowledge and information. The model is: "Here,
I think you need this: Take it." The result is, let us say, that when music under the
present system leaves the postproduction studio and passes through six hands, it is
not in the store yet. Whereas, in Stanley Milgram's United States, after six jumps,
everybody who wants the music has it. The systems for the proprietary distribu-
tion of culture, the systems-in which the right to distribute is bought and sold-
are the Trabant factories of the twenty-first century. They are hopelessly ineffi-
cient, they are the outcome of a social philosophy that is utterly defunct, they fail
to respond to the existing presence of a robust and superior competitor: they are
through.
Of course, the coercive power of the state will be summoned in endless quan-
tity, to reassert the right of Trabant to make inferior automobiles and force them on
helpless consumers. And even then, their days are numbered. Because you cannot
put all the twelve-year-olds in jail, and because you cannot teach them in school
that sharing information is wrong. That is it. End of game.
So, we now find ourselves, if you will permit, projected approximately twenty-
five to thirty years into the future. Software is a service, a public utility, being
produced primarily by people we presently call "students," doing something we
presently call "learning." The primary services being sold in the Capitalist economy
with respect to software are project management, indemnification, distributional
customization, and tailoring, piece by piece, to the individual need of consumers.
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That work is being done on a basis which is commons reinforcing, so that it has a
tendency, as such work should, to put itself out of business. And it is therefore a
much lighter and simpler industry than the present one.
Governments do not buy software at exclusionary prices. This is what is giv-
ing Mr. Mundie the heart attack he is having, and why he is saying the absurd
things he is saying in Brazil.
Two years ago we began a campaign to point out to governments that they
ought not to subsidize monopolists by buying unfree software. I was invited to
speak at the Business Software Alliance last November, and to Emory Simon, I
owe my continuing thanks for that experience. I felt a little like Fidel in Miami,
but in fact, I was treated with a warmth that belied the comparison. I said there,
and I think it represents the simple truth, that the government market is one in
which there should be free, open, and unrestricted competition. Our position is
that every government employee, everywhere on earth, should have a desktop fully
compatible with all the data now in existence, with which everything can be done
that that government official needs to do, that the price of acquisition to that gov-
ernment should be zero, and that government should be free to make as many
copies of that software as it has public employees and to distribute that software in
any way it wants. Those are the terms on which we propose to supply software to
government, and we assume that anybody intending to compete in that market will
adopt terms at least as favorable to the public and to the public fisc, as our terms.
Oddly enough, that does not represent the terms on which the monopoly pro-
poses to offer software to the public, and therefore there is a continuing assump-
tion that governments around the world will continue to pour billions of dollars of
subsidy into the continuance of the proprietary production of software. Emory
will explain in due course why that is good.
I will only point out that so long as that is good, the system of distribution of
culture by means that are efficient for the distribution of all cultural goods will be
to some extent inhibited, because the software which performs distribution will be
regarded as illegal or unavailable. The building of networks means building the
systems for sharing of data. Industries that own data on exclusionary terms then
turn around and attempt to prevent networks from working because networks share
data and the goal is not to share. The result is that the owners of the technology are
put under pressure to facilitate a network which does not share data efficiently.
The attempt is to move the inefficiency of the distribution system into the technol-
ogy itself, and that of course requires technology that the users cannot change. For
if the users can understand and change the technology, they will remove the ineffi-
ciencies and resume using the networks for their intended purpose, which is the
sharing of information.
Accordingly, we now face a fundamental choice: whether we plan to employ
free software, with the inevitable corollaries that it presents with respect to the
replacement of a dead system of inefficient distribution by a live, vital and impor-
tant system of efficient distribution, or to attempt to control every computer and
appliance in the network in the interest of distributors of a few specific classes of
bitstreams, who regard their bitstreams as their property.
For this reason, again I want to point out the phrase "Open Source" does not
capture very well what is really happening. What we are actually deciding is whether
to free the network to be a network, or to control the network as a form of broad-
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casting-a form of proprietary distribution by a few favorite individuals in which
the remaining individuals are regarded as-the phrase is so familiar it rolls off the
tongue without a second look--consumers. Meaning, non-producers, non-cre-
ators. We have become so accustomed to that model of that understanding of the
human mind-that a few people create and the others consume-that we do not
even recognize when we say it what it implies about the people in general. How
anti-democratic, our basic assumption is: there are some creators, and there are
consumers. This is the moral question of the age. We mean to solve it. By freeing
the technology that runs the network, we change the way the network operates as a
connector of human minds. That is the goal.
Eventually, we reach the question of the network infrastructure itself. So, let
us go back to that Motorola cell phone. Like every other appliance, it will contain
free software-it cannot afford not to. And as things are at present, I get calls from
the manufacturers of such radio communications appliances relatively frequently.
"We are making an Open Source-Linux-Free Software architecture board in-
side our enterprise." "I'm surprised to hear it," I say. "We would like you to
affiliate yourself with us, etc." "I am very interested in the discussion," I say. "By
the way, you do have two chips in that phone, don't you?" "Yes, of course we do,
we must, one chip that runs free software, that does the keypad, and the screen, and
all the user interface operations, and one chip which doesn't run free software,
which controls the radio. We have to do it that way. If we don't, the regulators all
over the world will beat us up and they won't let us sell the appliance." "Yes," I
say. "I know." And then, as if by magic, the same phrase pops out of them each
time: "But it is so expensive." "Yes," I say. "And that is why, ten years from now,
you are going to be helping me to destroy spectrum regulation all over the world-
because the logic of Capitalism compels you to save that other fifteen dollars for
that second chip." But of course, once you have general software-controlled radio,
under the general control of free software, users make decisions about the spec-
trum, not regulators. How odd! It is our spectrum-how strange that we should be
making decisions about it. How peculiar that democracy might actually say, "we
decide how to use channel seven. It does not belong to Mr. Murdoch, it belongs to
us!"
Now, of course, there was a time when we regarded it as absolutely necessary
for government coercively to decide who used channel seven. The problem was
interference, which was a real problem as severe as the problem of recouping the
cost of the industrial production and distribution of information. Then, we went
digital. Cell phones learned to share spectrum. The problem of interference, as
real and serious as it was, like the problem of recouping the non-zero marginal cost
of the book, went away. But the underlying system of social relations did not
change. And we are not merely talking about Mr. Murdoch's interest in the ability
to reach one hundred eighty million people, as opposed to my ability to reach
fifteen-we are also talking about Verizon's view that the spectrum should be sold
to us, by the sip, for personal communications.
What should we do instead? We should share the spectrum. This is what the
Wi-Fi revolution is beginning to suggest to civil society. We should just build
mesh networks and interconnect them. And we should send our voice and data
communications over those networks, and we should do so in a decentralized way
which does not require us to rent our switching capacity from the telecommunica-
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tions oligopoly. We do not need them anymore, people are beginning to recog-
nize-and this is true. Free Software will assist in the next twenty years with both
of those most extraordinary changes. Because as the devices that use radio inevi-
tably come to include software that users can modify, and as the barbed wire civil
war moves inside the box (tamper-proof chips, laws against removing one chip
and replacing it with another, laws against reprogramming cell phones, etc.) it
turns out that you cannot put every fifteen-year-old on earth in jail. And when
people realize that they are paying two hundred dollars a month-this for the wired
phone, that for the wireless, that for the cable-or, they could put a fifteen dollar
box in their pockets and talk all the time, and have fast data communications for
everywhere for the rest of their lives, it becomes a civil society issue. It becomes
a political issue. That means that, in the United States, it becomes an issue of
money. Of the twenty-five largest contributors to political campaigns in the 2002
election cycle, eight were telecommunications oligopolists. That is where we are
heading.
Free Software is, at the moment, about giving Mr. Mundie a headache. We are
going to spend the next two days at this conference talking about the restricted part
of what is going on: the transformation of the software industry from commodity
to service. The transformation of the system of production from one which as-
sumes exclusionary production is superior, to one which discovers that non-exclu-
sionary production is superior. We are going to discuss how enterprises adjust to
that change, how individual researchers and programmers adjust to that change,
how the nuances of legal relationships affect the ways in which that change works.
This is a fascinating conversation. I have been thinking about it for fifteen years.
I have a lot of fun doing it. I just want you to understand that such talk is the
beginning of something way more important, that in order to understand why it is
important you have to understand why it is at all. It will not do to say it is Open
Source. You will get a good idea about the software business but you will not
understand any of the rest of this because it will not be clear why what is happen-
ing is happening, or why the newspaper headlines read the way they do. What we
are going through is a fundamental alteration in the areas of intellectual infrastruc-
ture and production all over the world. We are talking about just one little piece.
You have got to understand that the struggle is bigger than that. That it is more
serious. That it commits us to fundamental moral questions that which we have to
take a side about. That the work we do as lawyers, engineers, and programmers
now is about the future of freedom of ideas all over everywhere. That it means
confrontations just as improbable in scale as the confrontation between the Microsoft
Corporation and the Free Software Foundation, which I did not name but which
Mr. Mundie did. David and Goliath? Hell no. Goliath was just a big human
being, basically the same as David but larger.
I was in Redmond, Washington recently, having a nice, pleasant conversation
in a little conference room with nine guys surrounding me on every side. I said,
"Okay, it is time for another one of our recurrent talks between the movement and
the firm. We are not talking about things that are parallel in scale, or size, or
feature, or nature, or composition. We are talking about a confrontation between
two fundamentally different forms of social organization. It does not behave the
way inter-firm competition behaves in a competitive market. It does not have
anything to do with what it looks like in Microeconomics 101. There are features
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that can be put up on the two axes that way: you can draw supply and demand
curves, and you can get real answers. I do'not say otherwise. There are features of
this, well-studied that way.. But it is important to get out past that in order to
understand what is happening. Two different philosophies about the nature of
human intellectual production are in confrontation. One of them hasall the chips;
the other has all the right answers. This is part of the long struggle in the history of
human beings for the creation of freedom. This time, we win.
Thank you very much.
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